

HAUSLER affair), but the first section is quite well known to us.

The ~~STADTSSICHERHEIT~~ was not properly speaking an Intelligence organisation, little is known of its activities and we will say only a few words.

The only information obtained regarding this service (known as the S.D.) indicates that its activity corresponded more or less to our Military Security in the German Army - official C.E. - anti-communist, anti-gaullist activity, Jewish questions etc.) It seems to have been the object of fearful veneration on the part of the other services. It was this service in particular which directed FIERPI and his brigade.

It was commanded by a Major; bald, small and always in uniform.

WIRTH, a Lieutenant (tall, dark, 35 years old) probably in charge of C.E. work, belonged to this service, also another Lieutenant [l. n. 85, fair, speaking French, Arabic and Italian, wearing spectacles with gold rims]

The Communist section was commanded by Captain MOLTRECHT (tall, thin, blue eyes, very fair, speaking quite good French). He was seconded by Lieutenant ALTHAUS (small, fat, brown hair, black eyes, speaking little French).

The STADTSSICHERHEIT.

(The following mentions only points characteristic to this service, leaving aside anything that it may have in common with the ~~ABWEHR~~)

a) Personnel.

Generally in civilian clothes and were only seen in uniform on very rare occasions.

The Chief of the office was Major REISENER, whose exact rank in the S.S. was HAUPTSTURMSANFUHRER (l. n. 80. Large. Dark brown hair. High forehead. Scar on left cheek from ear to mouth. Large white mark on left hand. Speaks French with an accent).

His deputy was Lieutenant MATSCHKE, whom many agents called Captain, and who was in reality Sturmbannfuhrer (l. n. 62 to l. n. 65. Brown hair combed back. Blue eyes. Speaks quite good French. Freckled. Was always in a SIMCA 5. Called "Paul Martin".

An officer of the service distinguished for his instability and his collection was Lieutenant RITTER (tall, good looking, high forehead, brown hair, small scar on left side of mouth. RITTER left Tunis in the beginning of April, 'for the Russian front'. Speaks French perfectly. Pretends to be Belgian from Malmédy, but it is certain that he lived in France for a long time.

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He seems to like women and does not hesitate to wear himself off as a Frenchman: In Rome he called himself "ROULEAU", in Tunis, "ARVIN" like MATSCHKE.

Finally the service included one administrative officer, Lieutenant LOBI, (21 years, small, very straight, fair, medium build), speaks a little French). Was generally in uniform.

Non-com. officers.

The most frequently mentioned is THUSCHNIG, Sergeant. Principal secretary to BEISSENER (tall, thin, dark, very highly strung, blue eyes, knows a little French).

RIEM. First Sergeant. Radio specialist. (Tall, dark, clean shaven, blue eyes, very deep set. High forehead. Speaks a little French. Was often in uniform.

MEMME. First Sergeant. In charge of cyphering. (Small, fat, fair, hair brushed back) Spoke no French.

JAESSE. In charge of the mess and supplies (Small, fair, blue eyes. Parted on one side).

A typist was also employed in the office. She was Alsatian and spoke very good French, (short, stout, 25 - 26 years, brown hair) She was called ELISA.

A journalist called VOLLMER lived in the entourage of BEISSENER-RITTER. (1 m 75, fair, piercing eyes, 45 years) Spoke French and a little Arabic. He lived at 19 Avenue de Paris and also was often in the company of RAHN and KOKLAUSSE. He recruited agents for BEISSENER. He had also entrance to no. 168.

PREMISES.

The offices were at 168 Avenue de Paris. The neighbouring villa, no. 170 also belonged to the service, and it was here that was located the "Central", which probably means a transmission centre (radio and other).

BEISSENER lived in a Villa in Place Pasteur (Belvedere quarter). In addition no. 21 Rue Duclaux was occupied by BEISSENER and RITTER when RAUFF was at no. 23.

The villa of M. LEVI at Sidi Bou Saide, seems to have played an important part in all S.S. affairs. There the food was good, the air pure and the view delightful and there were as many elegant parties as there were serious discussions. For a long time KOHLASS was the mysterious permanent lodger who knew how to disappear when the owners arrived.

It seems that this villa was also used as a place of retreat, of refuge and rest for certain agents.

One of the characteristics of the S.S. officers was their liking for travelling around. In the ABWEHR it was the agents who went to see the officers of the service. In the S.S. it is the contrary: BEISSENER was always in a

in a car, and RITTER went from bars to meeting places, so that one comes across their trail everywhere.

The American Consulate in the Rue de la Ruche was occupied by them, they also often visited a certain number of localities, in different parts of Tunis, which served as places of detention for the natives or for certain prisoners of war. The meetings were fixed outside the office; for the most part in the street; for example in front of the S.S. garage in Avenue Carnot.

c. Functions of the STADTSSICHERHEIT.

The essential mission of the Stadtssicherheit seems to have been to collect information; primarily political and then military. Further, it is certain that it was not only an information organization but was also operational.

The aims of the service were;

a) To collect information. In order to do this it had a network of informants who kept the service informed of everything that happened in occupied Tunisia, both ~~domestic~~ as regards French and Tunisian politics.

To resume the question of BEISSENER's and RITTER's informants before May 8th is to resume the whole political situation during that period.

BEISSENER's informants were collaborators, Germanophiles and above all nationalists who were numerous before the occupation and disappeared after the arrival of the Allies to reappear as "Americanophile".

This network theoretically broke on May 8th.

b) Operational. The active role of the Stadtssicherheit was brought to light by the attempt by BEISSENER to take the Prince Ali Bey, nephew of the then reigning BEY, to Europe in spite of the opposition of the ~~the~~ Beylical Court. He very nearly succeeded in this enterprise, which he organized himself with the help of the prince's best friend.

The Stadtssicherheit, however, did not wish its mission of information to end with the occupation of Tunisia, and one of the main concerns of the service was to set up a system of information by which it would continue to be kept informed from a distance.

This system included;

Informants - BEISSENER tried to keep all those who had been of service to him during the occupation.

Radio operators to transmit the information obtained by the agents.

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In fact, he tried to carry on from a distance the work which had been undertaken in Tunis during the occupation. To pass from the network of the Vichy to that after May 10th he introduced means of transmission of communication between himself and his agents.

The communications were also used to transmit military information, so that the Stadtsicherheit became a competitor of the ABWEHR on this point. (However an opportunity arose during the occupation the S.S. sent agents across the lines and as far as Constantine)

B. Organisation.

a) Recruitment.

As we have just seen, it was twofold:

- 1) Radio operators.
- 2) Informants.

The radio operators were recruited among the Tunisian ~~settlers~~ or Algerian natives (in particular Algerian 'tirailleurs' prisoners, but they were all placed in the charge, or at least under the supervision of a German ex-Legionnaire called VOGL. The best known recruiters are Professor ABERRAHMANE, BECHIRI MOUSSA, ABDELHAMID BACHLOULI and BENJEMMA, whose exact role remains to be defined.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the radio operators were at first recruited by the ABWEHR. They attended the courses at Mutuelleville and were only later handed over to the Stadtsicherheit, and the fact that the ABWEHR never reclaimed them shows that the Gestapo when desirable, could deal flipperantly with the ABWEHR.

As for the recruiting of informants, enough has already been said on this subject for it to be unnecessary to revert to it at length. After March, feeling that the occupation of Tunisia could not be maintained much longer, REISSNER, RITTER and their acolytes began to unveil; at first in indirect terms, and later they asked their friends in whom they had the most confidence, frankly whether they were disposed to continue to furnish information after the departure of the Axis troops. Those who were convinced and 'tough' accepted and entered into relations with the radio operators charged to transmit information. In this way they became ~~informants~~ agents for political information.

On the other hand military information was to be furnished by each one (informant and radio operator). Everybody was to collaborate ... for the victory of Germany and the independence of Islam countries (in this case recruits were also made on the Nationalist theme)

b) Instruction.

Only the radio operators and cypherers received any technical instruction, since the real agents who only supplied political information, had

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had nothing to learn.

In comparison with the instruction of the ARWEHR, that of this service seems to have been more important. The courses were long, the meetings frequent and the professor was one of those who were to remain in an operational capacity, and took his work to heart.

The sets were of the 'gasoline time' variety, and the transmitting set differed from the receiving set.

With regarding to cyphers the procedure seems to have been less efficient than that of the ARWEHR, since, contrary to the latter, they were based on a ~~system~~ more or less multiple transposition system.

This fundamental difference between the procedure of the ARWEHR and that of the Stadtsicherheit leads to believe that the systems are not supplied to the Intelligence service by one and the same organisation. Either, the cypher section of the Army has no connection with that of the Gestapo, or the Intelligence services establish their own systems.

The courses in cyphering and radio took place at no. 8 Avenue Carnot, above the S.S. garage in the private residence of VOGL.

c) Missions.

The essentials have been outlined above.

The information required is chiefly political information, the proof of this can be seen by consulting the list of certain agents contacted by REISSNER with a view to collecting information:

TIXIER VIGNANCOURT.	Known political figure. Called upon perhaps to play a part after the return of the Allies.
FAUCHER.	P.P.P. member. Called upon to be responsible for the party after the departure of the Allies.
ABDERRAHMANE.	Great friend of the Princes of the Beylical family.
HASSAN KADPOUR.	Established pro-French reputation. Well introduced into all intellectual Tunisian circles.
SLAHEDDINE	Former secretary of the Bey, very well informed on Tunisian politics.
	etc..... etc.....

There were practically no questionnaires. FAUCHER apparently supplied information on Jewish and Communist activities; ABDERRAHMANE and SLAHEDDINE on the Bey and the Court; HASSAN KADPOUR on Tunisian politics; TIXIER VIGNANCOURT on French politics, etc.

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The same vagueness seems to have existed with regard to the military information asked for. The agents never received instructions to direct their activities more towards one branch of information than another. Everything was worth being transmitted.

d) Organisation after evacuation.

The set-up of the organisation left by the S.S. to work after the evacuation of Tunis was distinguished by being of one 'block'. HEISSENER seems to have created one outfit in which everything held together. There were no more separate sections, for example on May 8 one and only one agent was in charge of the 8 radio sets which remained for the service, and starting from VOGL alone, the interrogators were able to trace back the whole organisation so easily that for a long time it was wondered whether this service had not been left to "amuse" the C.E. services, while a more serious organisation was left to work in peace. If the service had not been stopped at the beginning, it would have functioned because it had an animator in the person of the German, ex-legionnaire, VOGL.

Unfortunately for HEISSENER, during the month of March, one of the Algerian 'tirailleurs' whom he had recruited, informed the French Police Ser. (Inspector JOST) of what was being prepared and the organisation was followed May 10.

So that HEISSENER was no more fortunate than SEUBERT.

Before leaving the STADTSSICHERHEIT, it seems necessary to open a special chapter, one which, as concerns the ABWEHR was reduced to very little the chapter on technical faults. (As we have seen, although there were few technical faults in the Abwehr, there were on the other hand faults of a psychological nature).

It seems that the officers of the STADTSSICHERHEIT were only occasional officers of the ABWEHR. Their work was far from being as 'finishing' as that of the ABWEHR.

We have already seen the complete lack of any division into compartments (a bad error especially when everything depends on one system). But there were others which although less important were none the less characteristic of a lack of knowledge of the job.

For example: To whom did HEISSENER entrust his four radio sets? To a German ex-legionnaire and to three tirailleurs of the 2nd. R.T.A., taken prisoner at Sidi in January 1943. VOGL did receive a changed identity but it was sufficient to converse with him for two minutes to realise that he was not French. Further he is an inveterate drunkard who would drink all the money he is given and even more. In spite of his willingness to do well he is in danger of being caught at each of his alcoholic crises.

As for the three tirailleurs, an officer of the ABWEHR worthy of the name, would surely have renounced their services. As men they are all right

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It should not be forgotten that they are soldiers and that as such they are bound to be recuperated by their corps as liberated prisoners; they are at the mercy of the slightest verification of identity or of the first meeting with other members of their regiment. It is unquestionable that the recruiting system of the ABWEHR was more logical.

On the other hand although the STADTSICHERHEIT had prepared the installation of its organization for a very long time, it was far more taken by surprise that was the ABWEHR, and it was only on the night of May 6/7 that VOGL received the radio sets.

The material needs of the agents were on the contrary better looked after, but the same principles were applied as for the recruiting of agents; radio operators were lodged with acquaintances of BEISSNER, German sympathizers, Destourians etc.

To enquire into espionage activities on behalf of the S.S. since May is to enquire into the activities of the ex-friends of BEISSNER, RITTER and MATSCHKE. It is for this reason that the C.E. services consider each one of them as suspect and enquiry concerning them as necessary.

GENERAL.

1) Camouflage. One of the agents received 5000,000 francs to start a business which was to serve as a means of livelihood and as cover for the group.

2) Funds. Nothing special.

The above is a resume of general information gathered from the material dealt with up to date. Every day further information enables us to increase precisely our knowledge. Although this note has been written with the most objectivity it would not be surprising if one day it were to contradict some of the statements contained therein and that this is only a preliminary study of the question.

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